Funding Gaps 2006 by Eli Pristoop et al.
2 0 0 6
FUNDING GAPS
The Education Trust
®
As Americans, we rightly take pride in the fact that the 
United States has led the world in extending free public 
education to all children, including those from racial and 
language minorities, those living in poverty, and those with 
disabilities. We extend this opportunity with the conviction 
that if given a fair shot at a good education these students, 
through hard work, can rise above the challenges they 
face and find a secure place at the heart of the American 
mainstream. 
What many Americans don’t fully understand, however, 
is that even as we’ve extended a free public education to all 
children, we’ve rigged the system against the success of some 
of our most vulnerable children. How do we do that? By 
taking the children who arrive at school with the greatest 
needs and giving them less in school. Our low-income and 
minority students, in particular, get less of what matters 
most; these students get the fewest experienced and well-
educated teachers, the least rigorous curriculum, and the 
lowest quality facilities.1 
At the core of these inequities is a set of school finance 
policy choices that systematically shortchange low-income 
and minority students and the schools and districts that 
serve them. In this unprecedented look at school funding 
across multiple levels—federal, state, and district—we show 
how funding choices at each of these levels tilt away from 
equity. 
• The first analysis examines how federal education 
funds for low-income students are distributed among 
states. It finds that rich states are rewarded with richer 
federal aid packages, and that poor ones get less. 
• The second set of analyses scrutinizes spending 
differences among school districts within states and 
finds that most states shortchange their highest 
poverty and highest minority school districts. 
• The third analysis examines how school districts spend 
their money, and finds inequalities within school 
districts, with less money spent in schools serving the 
most disadvantaged students.
Taken together these analyses make clear how—despite 
our national commitment to fairness and educational 
opportunity for all—a series of separate school funding 
choices stack the deck against the students who need the 
greatest support from their schools. 
Over the last several years, there’s been a flurry of 
activity aimed at addressing the achievement gap that 
separates low-income students and students of color from 
their more affluent and White peers. Yet year after year test 
results show precious little progress. It’s easy to understand 
why some are growing frustrated and even discouraged. But 
the truth is, despite the new attention to the gap, we so far 
have failed to address the fundamental inequities—such as 
the funding gaps highlighted in this report—that are buried 
deep in our education systems. And until these inequities are 
exposed and addressed by the adults who make the policy 
choices that affect children we will continue to undermine 
our professed goal of providing equal opportunities for all.
Funding is just the most easily measured among the 
myriad ways in which public education systematically puts 
students of color and low-income students—and the schools 
these students attend—at a disadvantage. Securing equity 
in funding would send a powerful signal that equity is more 
than just a rhetorical priority. Fairer finance systems are not 
a silver bullet, but they are a first step toward the harder 
work of substantive education improvement. 
We offer this new report with the hope that the 
information provided herein will arm policymakers, parents, 
and educators with the facts they need to make new policy 
choices that will make real our aspiration to give every 
student a fair chance.
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How the Federal Government Makes Rich
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Ethnicity and Diversity, University of California, Berkeley. This paper is adapted from a December 2006 article in 
New York University Law Review.
Any serious effort by the federal government to improve 
equality of educational opportunity must confront a sobering 
and often neglected fact: Funding gaps among states are even 
larger than funding gaps within states. In 2003-04, the ten 
highest spending states spent an average of more than 50 
percent more dollars per pupil than was spent by the lowest 
spending ten states. Low-spending states are clustered in the 
South, Southwest, and West, and serve a disproportionate 
share of the nation’s poor children.
The purpose of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act is to level the educational playing field for 
poor children. Given this ambition, one would expect Title 
I to disproportionately benefit low-spending states, where 
low-income students are concentrated. But the reality 
is otherwise. Wealthier, higher-spending states receive a 
disproportionate share of Title I funds, thereby exacerbating 
the profound differences in education spending from state 
to state. Title I makes rich states richer and leaves poor states 
behind.
The problem lies in the Title I formulas. Under the 
three main formulas (basic, concentration, and targeted 
grants), each state’s Title I allocation is largely a product of 
two factors. The first is the number and concentration of 
poor children in the school districts of each state. This factor 
benefits poorer states because they have disproportionate 
numbers of low-income children. But the second factor is 
the average per-pupil expenditure in the state. This state 
expenditure factor means that high-spending states get more 
Title I money per poor child than low-spending states. The 
net effect is that Title I does not reduce, but rather reinforces, 
inequality among states.
As Table 1 shows, interstate differences in Title I 
allocations are not small. Column A lists the number and 
percentage of the nation’s poor children in each state in 
2003, and column B lists each state’s share of Title I funds 
in 2003. Together, columns A and B show that states do not 
receive Title I money in proportion to their shares of the 
nation’s low-income children. Maryland, for example, had 
fewer poor children than Arkansas but received 51 percent 
more Title I aid per poor child. Massachusetts had fewer 
low-income children than Oklahoma but received more than 
twice as much Title I aid per poor child. Similarly, Minnesota 
had fewer poor children than New Mexico but received 27 
percent more Title I aid per poor child.
Column C shows each state’s Title I funding per poor 
child in rank order. The amounts per poor child at the top 
are as much as double the amounts at the bottom, with the 
variation essentially mirroring interstate variation in per-
pupil spending. (Some of the highest amounts in column 
C reflect statutory minimum allocations for small states.) 
When these data are adjusted for geographic differences in 
educational costs, the degree of interstate inequality is slightly 
reduced but still quite substantial.
The state expenditure factor might be defensible if it 
served as a reward or incentive for higher state spending 
on education. But this is implausible for two reasons. First, 
Title I aid is too small to realistically motivate additional 
state or local spending; states typically do not spend an 
additional dollar just to capture a few extra pennies. Second, 
by linking Title I aid to state per-pupil spending, the state 
expenditure factor primarily rewards state fiscal capacity (i.e., 
taxable wealth per pupil, shown in Column A in Table 2), 
not educational effort (i.e., willingness to tax that wealth, 
shown in Column B in Table 2). Nonfederal education 
revenue is more highly correlated with state fiscal capacity 
than with state effort, and states with higher capacity tend 
to exert lower effort. Thus, tying federal aid to state per-
pupil spending does not reward effort so much as it rewards 
wealth. Indeed, in the examples above, the wealthier states 
(Maryland, Massachusetts, and Minnesota) exert less effort 
than the poorer states (Arkansas, Oklahoma, and New 
Mexico) but have higher per-pupil spending and thus receive 
higher Title I aid per poor child. 
Simply put, the state expenditure factor in the Title 
I formula should be eliminated. This reform would bring 
Title I into line with the aid formulas for special education, 
English language instruction, and child nutrition, all of 
which assign equal weight to eligible children regardless of 
the state where they reside. Title I should simply allocate 
aid in proportion to each state’s share of poor children. 
Moreover, instead of the state expenditure factor, Title 
I should include a cost factor to adjust for geographic 
3Funding Gaps 2006
Table 1: Children in Poverty and Title I Allocations, 2003-2004 (with percentage of national total)
A B C
Poor children Title I allocation Title I allocation 
per poor child
Wyoming 9,796 0.1 $28,964,809 0.3 $2,957
Vermont 9,667 0.1 27,005,035 0.2 2,794
North Dakota 11,245 0.1 30,329,411 0.3 2,697
Massachusetts 112,570 1.3 260,050,569 2.3 2,310
New Hampshire 13,140 0.2 29,733,465 0.3 2,263
Alaska 14,330 0.2 30,431,327 0.3 2,124
Maine 25,025 0.3 47,816,946 0.4 1,911
Delaware 16,038 0.2 30,637,587 0.3 1,910
Connecticut 55,987 0.7 106,557,518 1.0 1,903
New York 638,992 7.6 1,184,751,800 10.7 1,854
New Jersey 155,082 1.9 272,032,782 2.4 1,754
South Dakota 19,125 0.2 32,000,786 0.3 1,673
Michigan 251,533 3.0 420,799,581 3.8 1,673
Pennsylvania 274,088 3.3 438,337,029 3.9 1,599
Rhode Island 27,313 0.3 43,155,247 0.4 1,580
Wisconsin 96,223 1.1 151,746,825 1.4 1,577
Kansas 55,419 0.7 87,046,905 0.8 1,571
Montana 25,827 0.3 40,458,865 0.4 1,567
Ohio 258,749 3.1 399,821,239 3.6 1,545
Minnesota 76,892 0.9 117,728,364 1.1 1,531
Maryland 101,153 1.2 153,983,710 1.4 1,522
West Virginia 63,503 0.8 94,167,837 0.8 1,483
Nebraska 32,413 0.4 46,769,850 0.4 1,443
Illinois 333,173 4.0 478,793,210 4.3 1,437
Hawaii 26,720 0.3 36,094,503 0.3 1,351
Missouri 146,574 1.7 194,886,735 1.8 1,330
California 1,288,493 15.4 1,649,697,459 14.8 1,280
Iowa 49,808 0.6 62,955,699 0.6 1,264
Oregon 93,069 1.1 115,317,070 1.0 1,239
Louisiana 207,871 2.5 256,175,473 2.3 1,232
Virginia 149,256 1.8 182,110,558 1.6 1,220
New Mexico 85,331 1.0 103,273,759 0.9 1,210
Indiana 129,878 1.6 156,540,820 1.4 1,205
Kentucky 138,101 1.6 162,957,050 1.5 1,180
Georgia 292,431 3.5 343,346,663 3.1 1,174
South Carolina 138,465 1.7 157,877,214 1.4 1,140
Washington 138,049 1.6 157,166,797 1.4 1,138
Texas 902,369 10.8 1,018,467,898 9.2 1,129
Mississippi 139,374 1.7 157,215,840 1.4 1,128
Idaho 35,921 0.4 39,875,687 0.4 1,110
Oklahoma 117,122 1.4 128,454,510 1.2 1,097
Tennessee 171,970 2.1 185,694,729 1.7 1,080
Colorado 96,512 1.2 104,115,332 0.9 1,079
Alabama 165,578 2.0 177,362,455 1.6 1,071
North Carolina 248,492 3.0 261,980,283 2.4 1,054
Florida 512,261 6.1 523,834,879 4.7 1,023
Arkansas 105,100 1.3 106,001,974 1.0 1,009
Utah 49,259 0.6 45,809,427 0.4 930
Nevada 59,296 0.7 53,216,311 0.5 897
Arizona 213,295 2.5 187,860,284 1.7 881
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, 2003 (children ages 5 to 17 in poverty); U.S. Department of Education Budget Tables, ESEA Title I Grants to Local 
Educational Agencies by State, 2003.
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differences in educational costs. This approach would 
lessen interstate inequality because poor children are 
disproportionately concentrated in low-spending states and 
because equal federal dollars per eligible child provide a 
bigger boost, proportionally speaking, to low-spending states 
than to high-spending states.
Although eliminating the state expenditure factor in Title 
I would be a positive step, its effect on interstate inequality 
would be modest. A more serious effort to narrow interstate 
inequality requires three main policy components. First, the 
federal role in school finance must be substantially increased; 
the federal government cannot buy much equality when it 
spends only nine cents of every education dollar. Second, 
because interstate differences in education funding primarily 
reflect differences in fiscal capacity, federal aid should 
compensate for differences across states in their ability to 
support education. Medicaid provides an example of federal 
aid distributed in inverse proportion to state fiscal capacity. 
Third, in aiding states with low education spending, federal 
policy should distinguish between low fiscal capacity and low 
effort. Where low spending is due to low effort, the primary 
federal role should be to spur states toward greater effort. 
Congress could require low-effort states to gradually increase 
their effort up to a minimum threshold as a condition of 
receiving significantly expanded federal aid.
These reforms would not be cheap, and they would 
require robust political will. But the problem of interstate 
inequality is both glaring and longstanding. If we are serious 
about wanting to ensure that every child in America meets 
high standards, then we must develop a federal school 
finance policy equal to the task.
Table 2 State Fiscal Capacity and Educational Effort by State, 
2003-2004 (with percent of national average)
A B C
Total taxable 
resources
(per pupil)
Educational 
eff ort
Nonfederal 
revenue
(per pupil)
Alabama $178,064 89 3.27 93 $5,819 83
Alaska 159,139 80 3.66 104 5,822 83
Arizona 160,354 81 3.12 89 5,003 72
Arkansas 167,832 84 3.53 100 5,929 85
California 168,055 84 3.42 97 5,743 82
Colorado 230,315 116 2.96 84 6,818 98
Connecticut 253,996 128 3.44 98 8,737 125
Delaware 362,954 182 2.24 64 8,130 116
Florida 209,398 105 2.96 84 6,199 89
Georgia 195,964 98 3.80 108 7,453 107
Hawaii 225,548 113 3.82 109 8,627 123
Idaho 157,727 79 3.57 101 5,626 80
Illinois 209,172 105 3.35 95 7,010 100
Indiana 208,503 105 3.96 113 8,264 118
Iowa 224,688 113 3.40 97 7,645 109
Kansas 212,974 107 3.79 108 8,075 116
Kentucky 187,524 94 3.28 93 6,147 88
Louisiana 182,526 92 3.23 92 5,890 84
Maine 187,498 94 4.27 121 8,013 115
Maryland 252,749 127 3.22 91 8,140 116
Massachusetts 234,883 118 3.39 96 7,966 114
Michigan 181,531 91 4.24 120 7,688 110
Minnesota 234,525 118 3.48 99 8,152 117
Mississippi 148,437 75 3.62 103 5,380 77
Missouri 206,812 104 3.30 94 6,823 98
Montana 178,136 90 3.65 104 6,505 93
Nebraska 232,972 117 3.42 97 7,968 114
Nevada 226,288 114 2.81 80 6,362 91
New Hampshire 232,031 117 3.39 96 7,875 113
New Jersey 234,549 118 4.34 123 10,186 146
New Mexico 157,280 79 3.79 108 5,962 85
New York 226,166 114 4.08 116 9,216 132
North Carolina 213,979 108 2.90 82 6,201 89
North Dakota 229,595 115 3.15 89 7,223 103
Ohio 201,149 101 3.92 111 7,890 113
Oklahoma 163,416 82 3.50 100 5,725 82
Oregon 202,845 102 3.43 98 6,966 100
Pennsylvania 216,454 109 3.75 106 8,113 116
Rhode Island 207,837 104 3.62 103 7,534 108
South Carolina 177,184 89 3.81 108 6,746 96
South Dakota 241,334 121 2.72 77 6,557 94
Tennessee 206,282 104 2.61 74 5,388 77
Texas 170,616 86 3.68 105 6,282 90
Utah 146,631 74 3.31 94 4,857 69
Vermont 203,727 102 4.63 131 9,425 135
Virginia 248,386 125 2.95 84 7,340 105
Washington 206,431 104 3.07 87 6,343 91
West Virginia 166,089 83 4.27 121 7,086 101
Wisconsin 217,554 109 3.91 111 8,514 122
Wyoming 263,292 132 3.49 99 9,191 131
Note: “Total taxable resources” (column A) is a measure of state fiscal capacity developed by the 
U.S. Department of Treasury; 2003 figures are available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/economic-
policy/resources/estimates.shtml. Nonfederal revenue data (column C) are from U.S. Census 
Bureau, Public Elementary-Secondary Education Finances: 2003-04 (table 1). The data in columns 
A and C are cost-adjusted dollars per weighted pupil. The cost adjustment applies the state-level 
Geographic Cost of Education Index in Jay G. Chambers, Geographic Variations in Public Schools’ 
Costs (NCES Working Paper No. 98-04, 1998) (table III-3). Pupil weights are 1.9 for students with 
disabilities, 1.6 for students in poverty, and 1.2 for English-language learners. Enrollment data 
used to derive weighted pupil counts are from NCES, Digest of Education Statistics 2005 (table 
33 (fall 2003 enrollment) and table 52 (children ages 6 to 21 served under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, Part B, 2003-04)); U.S. Census Bureau, Small Area Income and Poverty 
Estimates, 2003 (children ages 5 to 17 in poverty); and U.S. Department of Education, National 
Clearinghouse for English Language Acquisition and Language Instruction Educational Programs, 
ELL Demographics by State, 2003-04. Dividing column C by column A yields the “Educational 
effort” figures in Column B. Across the states, nonfederal revenue is more strongly correlated with 
fiscal capacity (.62) than with effort (.45). Further, capacity and effort are negatively correlated 
(–.39). With some exceptions, states with higher capacity tend to make less effort yet raise more 
revenue than states with lower capacity.
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How States Shortchange the Districts That 
Need the Most Help
By Ross Wiener and Eli Pristoop
Education Trust
States bear primary responsibility for public education.2 
As education has become more important to being an active 
citizen and earning a livelihood, states have increasingly 
exercised their authority to set rules for who can teach, what 
students are expected to learn in school, and how student 
learning is measured. Just as important, states determine 
how–and how equitably–education is funded.
The analyses on the pages that follow examine how well 
the states are living up to their obligation to fund public 
education equitably. There are encouraging examples of 
states that have stepped up to their responsibilities, but on 
the whole these data reveal serious problems with most state 
funding systems.
What This Analysis Does—and What it 
Does Not Do
This analysis focuses on state and local revenues. 
Federal revenues (which made up 8.9 percent of public 
school revenues in 2004) are not included, in order to 
isolate the specific effect of state policies on the educational 
opportunities provided to low-income children and children 
of color. Federal education funds are specifically meant to 
supplement, not supplant, state and local revenues. So it 
is appropriate to examine whether state policies equitably 
support public education in high-poverty and high-
minority districts.3 When states fail to equitably fund public 
education, federal funds are forced to make up for shortfalls, 
instead of providing the additional opportunities Congress 
intended.
Second, the analysis does not examine whether funding 
in any particular state is adequate. Rather, taking current 
spending as it is, this analysis asks whether the districts with 
the highest concentrations of low-income students and 
students of color are getting their fair share of state money.
Third, this report examines school district revenues, not 
practices or policies in terms of how the money is spent. At 
the Education Trust, we are acutely aware that how money is 
spent matters immensely in whether education is improved. 
We spend most of our time and energy trying to improve 
practice and policy so that existing resources in public 
education are used effectively. But we also know that many 
necessary improvements in the education of low-income and 
minority students will cost money.
Fourth, we have applied a consistent methodology to 
examining funding equity in 49 states (the exception is 
Hawaii, which operates a single, statewide school district). 
This methodology, which is described in the text and 
explained in detail in the technical appendix, allows for 
cross-state comparisons and provides good information on 
how funding is distributed between high- and low-poverty 
and high- and low-minority districts. But it is not ideally 
suited to analyzing a few unique state contexts. For example, 
the Clark County school district, home to Las Vegas, 
serves approximately 70 percent of Nevada’s public school 
students, so it is not possible to divide Nevada’s districts into 
comparable quartiles. 
We do not mean to imply that we have described the 
full range of school funding inequities. States that do not 
necessarily show large funding disparities in this analysis 
might show inequities if looked at through a different lens. 
We encourage researchers and advocates to use this data as a 
starting point for additional analysis.
How We Did the Analysis
This study analyzes annual financial data from each 
of the nation’s approximately 14,000 public school 
districts, gathered by the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. 
Department of Education. The calculations are based on the 
total amount of state and local revenues each district received 
for the 2003-2004 school year, the latest year for which such 
financial data are available.4 
To calculate funding gaps for each state, we compare 
average state and local revenues per student in the highest-
poverty school districts–those in the top 25 percent statewide 
in terms of the percent of students living below the federal 
poverty line–to per-student revenues in the lowest poverty 
school districts.5 These quartiles are built so each contains 
approximately the same total number of students. This 
procedure also is used to establish comparable quartiles for 
analyzing funding in high- and low-minority school districts.
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The analysis accounts for the fact that school districts 
vary in how much they need to spend depending on the 
different prices they have to pay for goods and services and 
the different kinds of students they have. Accordingly, we 
adjust for the local cost of providing education. In 2006, 
the National Center for Education Statistics released a new 
formula for adjusting for cost differences across school 
districts across the entire United States, and we applied that 
formula in these analyses.6 Using this new formula allows 
for the most fair comparisons across districts, but it makes 
the data in this report not perfectly comparable to previous 
Education Trust Funding Gap reports.
Similarly, we adjust our calculation of school district 
revenues based on the number of special education students 
enrolled, recognizing that districts with disproportionately 
more students with disabilities have higher costs and, thus, 
effectively less money to spend. The formula we used for 
this adjustment was developed by the American Institutes of 
Research and is widely used in school funding analyses.7 
Most States are Unfair to Their High-
Poverty and High-Minority Districts
In 26 of the 49 states studied, the highest poverty school 
districts receive fewer resources than the lowest poverty 
districts.8 As can be seen in Table 3, across the country, 
state and local funds provide $825 per student less in the 
highest poverty districts than in the most affluent districts.9 
Four states–Illinois, New Hampshire, New York, and 
Pennsylvania–shortchange their highest poverty districts by 
more than $1,000 per student per year. These states, and 
others that allow funding gaps to persist, are compounding 
the disadvantages that low-income students face outside of 
school and undercutting public education’s ability to act as 
an engine of social mobility. 
In 28 states, high-minority districts receive less state and 
local money for each child than low-minority districts (Table 
4). Across the country, $908 less per student is spent on 
students in the districts educating the most students of color, 
as compared to the districts educating the fewest students of 
color.10 
Equal Dollars Are Not Good Enough
The absolute dollar numbers in Table 3 actually 
understate the inequity suffered by high-poverty districts. 
To educate children growing up in poverty to common, 
meaningful standards costs more. Children from low-income 
families need more instructional time and especially well 
trained teachers. To provide another way of looking at state 
funding gaps, we also calculate the gaps with a 40 percent 
adjustment for educating students growing up in poverty.11 
We use this 40 percent adjustment because it is included 
in the federal Title I formula to determine whether state 
funding policies are fair to low-income students. Title I 
funding to states that do not meet this standard is reduced.12 
Studies that have attempted to quantify the additional costs 
of educating students growing up in poverty have often 
produced higher adjustments. Maryland, for example, 
determined that it would require virtually double the 
foundation funding to educate low-income students up to its 
state standards, and phased in a funding formula to meet that 
goal beginning in 2002.13 Others, such as Professor Liu, use a 
60 percent adjustment. 
Applying the 40 percent adjustment, the number of 
states that underfund school districts serving large numbers 
of poor children grows to 34, and the national gap goes 
from $825 to $1,307. Underneath this national gap lie huge 
differences among the states. Six states have per-student 
funding gaps that exceed $1,000 between high- and low-
poverty districts; once the 40 percent adjustment is applied, 
Michigan and Montana join the four states that have funding 
gaps in excess of $1,000 (Illinois, New Hampshire, New 
York, and Pennsylvania). 
A similar analysis based on districts serving students of 
color finds the same pattern: After the 40 percent adjustment 
for low-income students is made, school districts serving the 
largest concentrations of students of color receive $1,213 less 
per child than school districts serving the fewest children of 
color every year. (No adjustment is made on the basis of the 
percent minority enrollment.) Thirty states have funding 
gaps between their highest and lowest minority districts, 
and twelve have funding gaps that exceed $1,000 per child 
(Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
How to Read Tables 3 and 4
Tables 3 and 4 illustrate the gap in funding between 
highest and lowest poverty districts (Table 3) and 
highest and lowest minority districts (Table 4). When 
highest poverty and highest minority districts receive 
less per pupil, the gaps are shown with negative 
numbers. So, for example, the highest poverty districts 
in Alabama receive an average of $323 less per student 
than the lowest poverty districts, and the highest 
minority districts receive an average of $241 per student 
less than the lowest minority districts. In states where 
the highest poverty districts receive more money per 
pupil, the number is positive. So, for example, the 
highest poverty districts in Minnesota receive $1,349 
per student more than the lowest poverty districts.
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Table 3: Poverty Funding Gaps by State, 2004
State Gap Between Revenues 
per Student in the 
Highest - and Lowest 
- Poverty Districts 
(no adjustment for low-
income students)
Gap Between Revenues 
per Student in the 
Highest - and Lowest 
- Poverty Districts 
(40% adjustment for low-
income students)
Alabama -$323 -$656
Alaska 2,474 2,054
Arizona -225 -736
Arkansas -158 -500
California 218 -259
Colorado -70 -440
Connecticut 666 59
Delaware -207 -371
Florida -272 -461
Georgia 156 -292
Hawaii * *
Idaho -55 -257
Illinois -1,924 -2,355
Indiana 518 93
Iowa 82 -176
Kansas -549 -885
Kentucky 852 448
Louisiana -200 -481
Maine -137 -543
Maryland -123 -432
Massachusetts 1,299 694
Michigan -573 -1,072
Minnesota 1,349 950
Mississippi 207 -191
Missouri 190 -271
Montana -789 -1,148
Nebraska 515 210
Nevada -249 -297
New Hampshire -1,084 -1,297
New Jersey 1,824 1,069
New Mexico 1,106 679
New York -2,319 -2,927
North Carolina -344 -543
North Dakota 271 17
Ohio 683 113
Oklahoma 133 -213
Oregon 579 302
Pennsylvania -1,001 -1,511
Rhode Island 311 -394
South Carolina 414 127
South Dakota -147 -438
Tennessee 591 330
Texas -249 -757
USA -825 -1,307
Utah 860 663
Vermont -403 -894
Virginia -114 -436
Washington 196 -110
West Virginia -22 -345
Wisconsin -351 -742
Wyoming -303 -539
Table 4: Minority Funding Gaps by State, 2004
State Gap Between Revenues 
per Student in the 
Highest - and Lowest 
- Minority Districts 
(no adjustment for low-
income students)
Gap Between Revenues 
per Student in the 
Highest - and Lowest 
- Minority Districts 
(40% adjustment for low-
income students)
Alabama -$241 -$437
Alaska 4,955 4,435
Arizona -230 -680
Arkansas 445 253
California -160 -499
Colorado -799 -1,032
Connecticut -74 -602
Delaware 408 353
Florida 17 -106
Georgia 566 271
Hawaii * *
Idaho -836 -849
Illinois -1,223 -1,524
Indiana 1,345 1,096
Iowa -327 -414
Kansas -1,514 -1,630
Kentucky 150 274
Louisiana 355 111
Maine -817 -874
Maryland -302 -454
Massachusetts 1,663 1,139
Michigan 68 -251
Minnesota 898 623
Mississippi 413 26
Missouri 795 662
Montana -1,787 -1,838
Nebraska -1,280 -1,374
Nevada -470 -496
New Hampshire -2,371 -2,392
New Jersey 1,730 1,087
New Mexico 246 18
New York -2,239 -2,636
North Carolina -211 -296
North Dakota -1,259 -1,290
Ohio 1,285 942
Oklahoma -133 -383
Oregon 222 127
Pennsylvania -454 -709
Rhode Island -21 -639
South Carolina 392 206
South Dakota -962 -1,140
Tennessee 275 202
Texas -792 -1,167
USA -908 -1,213
Utah -202 -311
Vermont -800 -613
Virginia 418 239
Washington -87 -225
West Virginia 244 290
Wisconsin -1,043 -1,270
Wyoming -1,020 -1,041
Note: All dollar amounts in this chart have been adjusted to account for regional cost differences and the additional cost of educating students with Individualized Education Programs. This has the effect of reducing 
the effective level of funding in high-cost districts and districts with large numbers of students with disabilities. In addition, the third column in this table contains gap numbers that have been adjusted to account for 
the additional cost of educating low-income students (40% adjustment). For a more detailed explanation of the methodology used in this report, see the Technical Appendix.
Source: Education Trust calculations based on data from U.S. Census Bureau and U.S. Department of Education data for the 2003-2004 school year.
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Table 5: Percent of Elementary-Secondary Public School 
System Revenue from Local Sources by State: 2003-2004
State Name Percent of System Revenue 
from Local Sources
Alabama 32.8
Alaska 25.7
Arizona 43.3
Arkansas 15.4
California 34.1
Colorado 49.6
Connecticut 59.7
Delaware 27.9
Florida 45.6
Georgia 46.7
Idaho 31.6
Illinois 56
Indiana 44
Iowa 45.5
Kansas 40.8
Kentucky 30.4
Louisiana 38.2
Maine 50.4
Maryland 55.9
Massachusetts 53.6
Michigan 30
Minnesota 22.6
Mississippi 30.3
Missouri 47.9
Montana 40.4
Nebraska 58.2
Nevada 32.4
New Hampshire 48.6
New Jersey 53.3
New Mexico 13.1
New York 48.9
North Carolina 32.5
North Dakota 46.7
Ohio 49.2
Oklahoma 36.1
Oregon 38.2
Pennsylvania 56.1
Rhode Island 52.3
South Carolina 43.6
South Dakota 50.3
Tennessee 45.6
Texas 52.7
Utah 34.7
Vermont 23.9
Virginia 54.3
Washington 29.7
West Virginia 28.7
Wisconsin 41.7
Wyoming 38
USA 43.9
Source: “Public Education Finances 2004”. US Census Bureau. March 2006. Page 5. Table 5.
Per-Student Funding Gaps Add Up
For 
example, 
when you 
consider the 
per-student 
funding 
gap for 
low-income 
students 
(without 
40-percent 
adjustment 
for low-
income 
students) 
in…
Between 
two typical 
classrooms 
of 25 
students, 
that 
translates 
into a 
difference 
of….
Between 
two typical 
elementary 
schools 
of 400 
students, 
that 
translates 
into a 
difference 
of….
Between 
two typical 
high schools 
of 1,500 
students, 
that 
translates 
into a 
difference 
of….
New York $57,975 $927,600 $3,478,500
Illinois $48,100 $769,600 $2,886,000
Michigan $14,325 $229,200 $859,500
North Carolina $8,600 $137,600 $516,000
Delaware $5,175 $82,800 $310,500
Some states demonstrate that equitably funding 
education is possible. Kentucky and Massachusetts, for 
example, have targeted more money to high-poverty districts 
and coupled the monetary resources with meaningful 
accountability and technical assistance–and real progress has 
been accomplished.14 But equitable funding is not a panacea. 
Washington, for example, does not distribute its money in 
a particularly unfair way in comparison to other states, but 
that does not make up for the fact that it simply spends less 
on education than other states with similar wealth. There are, 
of course, examples where increased education funding has 
not translated into commensurate improvements in teaching 
and learning. We have to confront those issues seriously, but 
ignoring or condoning funding gaps only makes it harder to 
tackle the substantive problems.
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States Can Close Funding Gaps
Education reform poses many complicated issues, 
where additional innovation and research is still needed. 
Making education funding more fair, however, is not one of 
these issues. States need to take a greater share of education 
funding and target more money to the districts with the 
biggest challenges.
First, states should reduce reliance on local property 
taxes. As shown in Table 5, states vary dramatically in 
the extent to which local taxes fund schools–from a low 
of 13 percent in New Mexico to a high of 60 percent in 
Connecticut. Because wealth and property value are so 
unequally distributed, using local taxes as the primary 
resource for schools inherently gives wealthier communities 
an advantage in providing better educational opportunities. 
It is antithetical to states’ professed commitments to close 
achievement gaps to rely on local communities to fund 
education. This tradition reinforces privilege, exacerbates 
inequality, and is anachronistic at a time when we expect 
all students within a state to meet consistent, meaningful 
standards.
Once states assume more responsibility for education 
funding, they should target funds to help educate low-
income children. In Massachusetts, for example, local taxes 
account for a majority of public schools’ revenue, but state 
funding is highly targeted, which allows the state to do 
more to address funding equity than some other states. 
Wisconsin, in contrast, actually allocates a majority of all 
public education revenue at the state level, but still maintains 
funding gaps that disadvantage both high-poverty and high-
minority districts.
It is unfair that children’s educational horizons are 
limited by their neighborhoods’ demographics. As state 
education systems grow into their responsibilities in a 
standards-based world, they need to ensure that budgets 
reflect fairness and that resources are targeted to districts with 
the most need. Aligning state education funding policies 
with goals would mark necessary, but not sufficient, progress 
toward equality of educational opportunity.
How Districts Shortchange Low-income 
and Minority Students
By Marguerite Roza
Research Assistant Professor in the Center on Reinventing Public Education at the Daniel J. Evans School 
of Public Aff airs at the University of Washington.
It is well known that some school districts have more 
money to spend than others with consequent ill effects 
on poor and minority students. Analyses such as the ones 
contained in this report and well-publicized court cases 
have long documented the inequities between wealthier and 
poorer school districts.
Less well known is that, almost universally, school 
districts themselves magnify those initial inequities by 
directing more non-targeted money to schools and students 
with less need. Even school districts that claim to be 
spending more on high-poverty and high-minority schools 
can in fact spend considerably less, leading to predictable and 
devastating results for low-income and minority students.
To understand how these inequities develop within 
districts, it is necessary to understand the way school budgets 
are built. Typically, district budget documents report how 
money is spent by category and program rather than by 
school. As a result, even superintendents and school board 
members often do not know whether they spend more 
money on one school than another or whether they spend 
more or less on low-income and minority students. Layered 
onto those opaque accounting practices are long-established 
policies and practices—particularly regarding personnel 
assignments—that virtually guarantee that low-income and 
minority children have access to fewer resources than their 
more advantaged peers.15 
No large-scale national databases or analyses can be 
used to see these problems. However, in the last five years 
I and others have carefully analyzed the spending patterns 
of dozens of districts in more than 20 states. In some cases 
the districts only allowed us to examine their finances 
with the understanding that we would not name them. 
However, we can say that in many ways they typify large and 
medium-sized districts throughout the country. Two major 
patterns emerged in almost every district studied and can be 
presumed to be replicated in most large and medium-sized 
school districts.
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1) Less money is spent on salaries in high-poverty schools 
than on salaries in low-poverty schools within the 
same district.
2) Districts assign a larger share of unrestricted funds to 
low-poverty schools.
Let us examine each of these inequitable patterns.
1) Less money is spent on salaries in 
high-poverty schools than on salaries 
in low-poverty schools within the same 
district.
Evidence abounds that in many school districts the 
most experienced and highly paid teachers congregate in the 
district’s more affluent schools. At the same time, the least 
qualified, lowest paid teachers tend to serve in the schools 
with the highest numbers of low-income and minority 
students. A typical pattern is that a new teacher will start his 
or her career at a high-poverty school and, as he or she gains 
experience and moves up the pay scale, will transfer to a more 
affluent school. District transfer policies, sometimes codified 
in teacher union contracts, help facilitate this migration 
pattern. Additionally, after teaching in high-poverty schools, 
some newer teachers leave the profession, also contributing 
to the teacher turnover in the schools. 
Although there are no guarantees that teacher experience 
is an indicator of teacher quality, researchers generally agree 
that teacher effectiveness increases during the first five 
to seven years of teaching. Educationally, the migration 
pattern of teachers means that students who attend high-
minority and high-poverty schools have a lower chance of 
encountering a teacher at the peak of his or her effectiveness 
than students who attend more affluent schools with fewer 
students of color.
Financially, such teacher migration patterns mean that 
considerably less salary money is spent on high-poverty and 
high-minority schools. This disparity is often hidden by 
the fact that most district budgets report the distribution of 
staff positions at individual schools and not the distribution 
of teacher costs or teacher quality. Typically a district will 
allocate one teacher to a set number of students across all 
schools or types of schools (for example, all elementary 
schools will have a 1:18 ratio or all high schools will have 
a 1:22 ratio). The district will then report salaries at a 
particular school as the number of positions multiplied by 
the average salary paid by the district. By reporting salaries in 
this way (known as salary averaging), school districts disguise 
the actual salaries paid at individual schools.
When actual salaries are examined, the differences 
between high-poverty schools and low-poverty schools are 
significant and pervasive, as shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Gap between average teacher salaries in top and bottom 
poverty quartiles, by school district (2003-2004)
District Salary Gap
Austin* $3,837
Dallas* $2,494
Denver* $3,633
Fort Worth* $2,222
Houston* $1,880
Los Angeles** $1,413
Sacramento** $4,846
San Diego** $4,187
San Francisco** $1,286
San Jose Unified** $4,008
Sources: *Center for Reinventing Public Education Analyses, 2005
**Education Trust, Hidden Funding Gap, 2005, available at http://www.hiddengap.org/ 
In each city cited here, the district effectively spends less 
on teaching in schools with high concentrations of low-income 
students. And these are not the most extreme examples. A 
2002 analysis of Baltimore City showed that teachers at one 
high-poverty school were paid an average of almost $20,000 
less than those at another school in the same district.16 
Salary differences translate into big effects on school 
spending. For a school with 600 students and 25 teachers, a 
$4,000 average salary gap creates a difference of $100,000 per 
school. For a school with 1,700 students and 100 teachers, that 
is a difference of $400,000 per school.
Members of the general public often believe that high-
poverty and high-minority schools receive more money 
than other schools because they know that there are special 
programs targeted to high-poverty schools. In some cases, 
however, targeted funds don’t even make up for the salary 
differences.
$2,000
$3,000
$4,000
$5,000
District Budgets Actual Expenditures
Source: Roza, Marguerite and Paul Hill. “How Within-District Spending Inequities 
Help Some Schools to Fail,” Brooking Papers on Education Policy (2004).
High-Poverty School Low-Poverty School
Figure 1: Salary Averaging Diverts Resources 
Budgeted for High-Poverty Schools 
to Low-Poverty Schools*
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r P
up
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2) Districts further exacerbate inequality 
by assigning a larger share of 
unrestricted funds to low-poverty 
schools.
Each school in a district is supposed to receive an 
equal share of unrestricted funds, in addition to whatever 
categorical allocations are intended for the special needs of 
the students it has (such as for special education services 
or English-language instruction). Even after the salary 
differences between high- and low-poverty schools are 
accounted for, low-poverty schools still get more than their 
share of unrestricted dollars. In fact, salary differences only 
explain between 20 and 80 percent of the differences between 
spending at high- and low-poverty schools.
This somewhat unexpected finding first emerged in 
various analyses some two years ago,17 and other recent 
analyses confirm it. For example, data from the Public 
Policy Institute of California documented that low-poverty 
elementary schools tend to have larger teacher/pupil ratios 
and higher non-teacher expenditures than higher poverty 
schools.18 
Table 7: Unrestricted spending per pupil in elementary 
schools across sampled California Districts
Category Low Poverty High Poverty
Unrestricted Teacher Expenditures $2570 $1973
Teachers per 1000 students 44.9 41.5
Average teacher salary $57,242 $47,545
Unrestricted Other Expenditures $1839 $1648
Total Unrestricted $4409 $3621
Source: Rose, et. al (2006)
Interviews with district leaders have helped make sense 
of how and why this happens in their districts. Sometimes 
the placement of more expensive magnet or alternative 
programs drives up the costs in schools with fewer low-
income students. In Chicago, for instance, selective 
enrollment schools (those with admission requirements) 
spend some 15 percent more than the district average per 
pupil.19 In one district, the more affluent communities have 
smaller schools where per-pupil costs are higher. More often, 
the patterns are created in response to pressures to equalize 
services across all schools. Where earmarked categorical funds 
such as federal Title I money pay for such extra services as 
full-day kindergarten or reading specialists in high-need 
schools, more flexible state and local money is often used to 
fund the same services in the low-need schools.
The result is that general or unrestricted funds are 
skewed toward schools that do not qualify for targeted 
programs. Even when states restrict certain funds to 
provide extras for low-income students, school districts use 
unrestricted funds to provide similar services to more affluent 
students.
While the patterns somewhat vary by district, it is 
clear that most districts distribute the state and local funds 
they control inequitably. Again, this is masked by the way 
budgets are reported, showing expenditures coded by activity, 
function, and program, but not by school or student.
Emerging research indicates that there may be yet 
another way local districts shortchange low-income and 
minority students by inequitably distributing categorical 
funds targeted to specific kinds of students, such as money 
targeted to English-language learners. The way this seems 
to work is that districts put equally funded programs into 
schools regardless of how many students need them. For 
example, a district might allocate $100,000 to each school 
with English-language learners, even though one school 
might have 200 students with limited English proficiency 
and another—often a more affluent school—might have only 
20. This results in a per-pupil cost of $500 in the first school 
and $5,000 in the second. The research into this practice is 
still in the early stages20 and deserves further scrutiny.
The important point here is that school budgets are 
tangled webs, and it takes considerable amounts of analytic 
energy to unravel them in order to understand exactly how 
money is spent and on which students. When examined 
closely, however, it is clear that the typical school budget 
document is used to conceal very inequitable spending 
patterns.
To change these patterns, school boards, superintendents, 
and members of the general public should demand that 
budget documents be much more accurate and transparent 
so that all involved know exactly how resources are being 
distributed among different schools within the same school 
district. Accuracy demands that school budgets reflect 
actual teacher salaries, not district averages. Relying on 
average teacher salaries obscures the fact that less teacher 
salary money is allocated to the highest poverty and highest 
minority schools, where novice teachers and those with the 
least credentials are concentrated. One hopeful sign is that 
California, Texas, and Colorado have recently changed their 
school accounting practices to make it easier for school 
districts to report actual salaries by school level.
Collecting and disseminating truthful information about 
individual school budgets will help in acknowledging the 
problems, but it will take deliberate policies to change the 
underlying inequities. An increasing number of districts, 
including some of those that have allowed me and my 
colleagues to study them, are adopting student-based 
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allocation policies known as weighted student funding.21 
Others are changing the way teachers are compensated in 
order to change the way teacher talent and experience are 
distributed. If public school systems are serious about closing 
achievement gaps, they must begin to allocate more resources 
to the students with the greatest need. The previous sections 
of this report illustrate the important role of federal and state 
policies, but we cannot achieve real funding equity until we 
design school budgets that better respond to student needs.
13
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Conclusion and Recommendations
The fundamental promise of standards-based reform is that 
inputs vary so that outcomes can be held constant. While 
there are many intangibles on the input side of the education 
equation, we can at least measure whether money is being 
appropriately targeted to provide extra support to the 
students and schools who start out behind. By this score, we 
have yet to deliver on the promise of standards-based reform.
For standards and accountability to represent more than a 
hollow exhortation to “do better,” education funds must be 
directed to the places where they are most needed. Changing 
how education funds are distributed presents political 
challenges, but isolated progress at every level of government 
demonstrates that these issues can be overcome. Education 
is too important to our identity as Americans – and who we 
aspire to be – to allow current funding inequities to persist.
Below are recommendations for each level of government.
Federal Government
• Invest more in education. Despite a 40 percent 
increase in Title I funding within three years of 
enacting No Child Left Behind (NCLB), the federal 
government still only provided 8.9 percent of public 
education funds in 2004. There is only so much 
equity that can be secured with 9 cents of every 
education dollar.
• Target federal funds to high-poverty states. Title I 
currently rewards states that spend more on education 
without regard to differences in state capacity, which 
compounds the disadvantage of living in a low-wealth 
state. Federal policy should distinguish among states 
based on their effort in education funding, and help 
to address differences in capacity.
• Use federal funds more aggressively to force states 
and districts to disburse their own funds equitably. 
State and local policy have to be aligned with the 
national goal of closing achievement gaps, or the 
relatively small amount of federal funds will represent 
mere drops in a leaky bucket. Congress could start 
by updating the “comparability” provisions in Title I, 
which allow states to ignore inequities in state/local 
funding in Title I schools. 
State Governments
• Take more responsibility for education funding. 
As the constitutional guarantors of educational 
opportunity, states should ensure that public schools 
are funded adequately regardless of community 
wealth. Because the traditional role of local property 
taxes in funding local school districts inherently puts 
low-wealth and low property value communities at 
a disadvantage, states should rely more on statewide 
sources of revenue.
• Target more funding to high-poverty districts. 
Disbursing education dollars at the state level creates 
the opportunity for more equitable funding, but does 
not make equity inevitable. States need to assess the 
relative challenges across school districts and ensure 
that funding equitably addresses these challenges.
• Set funding equity standards for school districts. 
States have devolved authority for funding individual 
schools to school districts, but this cannot allow 
states to abdicate responsibility for ensuring equitable 
educational opportunities within districts. 
Local School Districts
• Publish transparent budget and allocation figures. 
While the destination of federal and state funds is 
easily traceable at the school-district level, school 
district budgets remain opaque and expenditures 
are often not even tracked at the school level. The 
lack of transparency shields local spending patterns 
from scrutiny and provides cover for pervasive and 
indefensible inequality among schools within the very 
same school districts. 
• Examine contract and budgeting provisions that 
perpetuate inequality. Most school districts have 
negotiated away their ability to use differential pay to 
attract and retain the best teachers in the hardest-to-
staff schools. Along with salary-averaging budgeting 
practices, this helps concentrate the most highly paid 
teachers in the schools with the fewest low-income 
students and students of color.
• Implement weighted student funding. To make 
good on the promise of educating just about all 
students to a common standard, we have to identify 
students’ needs and then allocate funds proportionate 
to those needs. School budgets currently are oriented 
to funding programs and staff allocations, without 
adequate differentiation based on student needs.
Pitched debates have been joined over whether it is 
possible for public education to educate all students to 
meaningful levels of academic proficiency. The truth is that 
we cannot know how much more is possible until we adjust 
our systems toward this goal. It would be a shame if the 
debates over what’s possible in public education were resolved 
without addressing patent unfairness in education funding.
Funding Gaps 2006 
14
Table 8: Percent Distribution of Elementary-Secondary Public School System Revenue 
by Source and State:, 2003-2004
State Federal State Local
Alabama 11.7 55.5 32.8
Alaska 19.4 54.9 25.7
Arizona 11.8 44.9 43.3
Arkansas 12.5 72.1 15.4
California 11.4 54.5 34.1
Colorado 6.7 43.7 49.6
Connecticut 5 35.3 59.7
Delaware 8.1 64 27.9
District of Columbia 15.4 . 84.6
Florida 10.1 44.4 45.6
Georgia 8.5 44.8 46.7
Hawaii 11.1 86.6 2.4
Idaho 10.2 58.2 31.6
Illinois 8.6 35.5 56
Indiana 6.4 49.6 44
Iowa 8.3 46.2 45.5
Kansas 7.8 51.4 40.8
Kentucky 11.8 57.8 30.4
Louisiana 13.8 48 38.2
Maine 8.9 40.7 50.4
Maryland 6.4 37.7 55.9
Massachusetts 6.5 39.8 53.6
Michigan 7.9 62 30
Minnesota 6 71.4 22.6
Mississippi 14.9 54.9 30.3
Missouri 7.9 44.2 47.9
Montana 15.2 44.4 40.4
Nebraska 9 32.8 58.2
Nevada 7.2 60.4 32.4
New Hampshire 5.6 45.8 48.6
New Jersey 4.3 42.4 53.3
New Mexico 17.2 69.7 13.1
New York 7.5 43.6 48.9
North Carolina 9.7 57.9 32.5
North Dakota 15.2 38.1 46.7
Ohio 6.9 43.9 49.2
Oklahoma 12.8 51.1 36.1
Oregon 9.1 52.7 38.2
Pennsylvania 8 35.9 56.1
Rhode Island 7.2 40.5 52.3
South Carolina 10.4 46 43.6
South Dakota 15.6 34.2 50.3
Tennessee 11 43.4 45.6
Texas 10.5 36.8 52.7
Utah 10 55.3 34.7
Vermont 8 68 23.9
Virginia 7 38.7 54.3
Washington 8.5 61.8 29.7
West Virginia 11.3 60 28.7
Wisconsin 6.1 52.2 41.7
Wyoming 9.9 52.1 38
USA 8.9 47.1 43.9
Appendix
Notes: Some data appear under local sources for Hawaii’s 
state-operated school system for consistency with data 
presented for all other school systems.
Source: Public Education Finances 2004. US Census Bureau. 
March 2006. Table 5.
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